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ABSTRACT. Using the 2008 corporate income tax reform as an opportunity, this 
paper constructs a Panel DID model to study the effect of corporate income tax 
and the degree of marketization on capital structure.  Based on the 2008 Enterprise 
Income Tax Reform in China, accompanying with both rise and fall in the tax rate, 
the paper tests the adaptability of the Modigliani & Miller theory, and develops a 
capital structure theory in the context of China. Author’s used the financial data 
of 206 Chinese listed companies from 2002 to 2012.  The financial data of listed 
companies were mainly taken from Xenophon database and GuoTaian database. 
The marketization index data were obtained from The Marketization Index in China: 
2011 Report for the Relative Marketization Process in Various Regions. Industries 
was classified according to the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) and 
test the sensitivity of the capital structure to exogenous corporate tax rate change in 
different industries. The empirical results show that: firstly, the higher the degree 
of marketization is, the more significant the tax shield effect is; secondly, compared 
to the corporate income tax, differences in the degree of marketization exert a more 
significant effect on the corporate capital structure; thirdly, because of the long 
existence of tax incentives, debt tax shield is not significant in people’s livelihood 
industries and information technology industry; Fourthly, given the upward trend in 
the overall asset-liability ratio of Chinese companies, in order to control companies’ 
financial risk, we recommend to foster market reform and the use corporate income 
tax incentives where necessary. The results of research will provide a reference for 
future marketization reform and tax policies in different industries in China.
KEYWORDS: Corporate income tax, corporate income tax reform, marketization, 
capital structure.
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ВЛИЯНИЕ КОРПОРАТИВНОГО НАЛОГА НА ПРИБЫЛЬ
И УРОВНЯ МАРКЕТИЗАЦИИ НА СТРУКТУРУ КАПИТАЛА 
ПУБЛИЧНЫХ КОМПАНИЙ КИТАЯ 
АННОТАЦИЯ. В статье анализируются данные об изменении структуры капи-
тала компаний в связи с реформой корпоративного налога на прибыль, акции 
которых обращаются на бирже. Изучается влияние степени маркетизации эко-
номики в регионах на структуру капитала компаний, расположенных в них. Ре-
форма налога на прибыль проводилась в 2008 г., ее результатом должно было 
стать постепенное (в течение 5 лет) снижение налога для большинства компаний 
с 33 до 25 %, а также повышение налога для части компаний с 15 до 25 %. Анализ 
изменения структуры капитала компаний вследствие повышения (понижения) 
налога на прибыль позволил подтвердить применимость теоремы Модильяни-
Миллера и развить теорию структуры капитала применительно к условиям Ки-
тая. Для анализа использовались данные о структуре капитала 206 компаний, 
акции которых обращались на бирже в 2002–2006 и 2008–2011 гг. В выборку по-
пали 75 компаний, у которых эффективная ставка налогов увеличилась, и 131 
компания, у которых она снизилась. Информация о их финансовых результатах 
была получена из баз данных Xenophon и Guotai. Результаты анализа подтвер-
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дили гипотезу о том, что степень рыночности экономики и изменение налога 
на прибыль влияют на структуру капитала, что позволило сделать следующие 
выводы: во-первых, повышение степени маркетизации, увеличивает экономию 
на налоговых выплатах, возникающую при реструктуризации капитала компа-
нии; во-вторых, рост степени маркетизации региона, увеличивая экономию на 
налоговых выплатах приводит к росту радикальных вариантов налогового пла-
нирования, используемых публичными компаниями; в-третьих, по сравнению с 
изменением ставки налога на прибыль, степень маркетизации оказывает более 
существенное влияние на структуру корпоративного капитала; в-четвертых, из-
за долгосрочного существования налоговых льгот, экономия на налоговых вы-
платах не имеет большого значения в отраслях производства потребительских 
товаров, здравоохранении и информационных технологиях. Отношение акти-
вов к пассивам китайских публичных компаний имеет тенденцию к увеличению, 
что, с одной стороны, отражает рост эффективности использования финансовых 
рычагов, а с другой — повышает операционные риски. Следовательно, в целях 
контроля финансовых рисков компаний необходимо стимулировать рыночные 
реформы и по возможности использовать льготы по налогу на прибыль.
КЛЮЧЕВЫЕ СЛОВА: налог на прибыль корпораций, реформирование нало-
га на прибыль корпораций, маркетизация, структура капитала.
Introduction
Capital structure, also known as 
the financing structure, is the value of 
composition and proportion relation of 
the long-term debt capital and equity 
capital. Differences in capital structures 
reflect the diversities in financial leverage 
and operating risk. For a long time, due to 
the strict approval process of bank loans, 
the relatively underdeveloped bond 
market and firms’ preference in equity 
financing, the average asset-liability ratio 
of listed companies in China is lower than 
that of those listed in the more matured 
market in developed countries. In recent 
years, Chinese enterprises’ asset-liability 
ratio rose from 48,76 % in 1993 to 86,76 % 
in 2010, and the uneven distribution 
among regions and industries is being 
exacerbated. In 2010, for example, the 
ratio of Beijing (90,29 %), the highest one, 
was around 1,93 times of that of Shaanxi 
(46,72 %), the lowest one. The ratio of 
the financing and insurance industries 
(93,49 %), the highest one, was 2,49 times 
of the ratio of the media and cultural 
industries (37,57 %), the lowest one1. 
However, the debt ratio should not be too 
high or too low, or it will be harmful to 
the corporate capital structure, and thus 
negatively affect the competitiveness and 
sustained development of enterprises.
Among all external factors that affect 
the capital structure, income tax burden 
has been widely acknowledged as one of 
the most important factors. Modigliani 
& Miller [1] who proposed the famous 
MM corporate tax model believe that, 
in the existence of corporate income tax, 
liabilities will increase corporate value as 
the interest reduces the tax. For investors, 
that means more distributable operating 
revenue. Many Chinese scholars have 
studied the adaptability of the theory 
in China. However, these studies fail to 
consider the institutional environment 
properly. The corporate income tax 
reform in 2008 reduced most of the 
corporations’ tax rate from 33 % to 25 %. 
At the same time, the tax rate for those 
whose previous rate was 15 % would be 
gradually increased to 25 % in a span of 
5 years. The reform, accompanying with 
both rise and fall in the tax rate, not only 
provides an excellent sample to test the 
adaptability of the MM theory, but also 
supplies a good opportunity to develop a 
capital structure theory that fits the context 
in China. Another external factor that 
significantly affects the corporate capital 
structure is the degree of marketization 
in the region where the corporation 
is located. As Myers (2003) stated, the 
institutional arrangements and financial 
1   Statistical Yearbook of the China Securities and 
Futures / China Securities Regulatory Commission, 
Xuelin Press, 2011.
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markets in different countries may 
present core varieties, resulting in the fact 
that the theory of capital structure cannot 
be simply applied to other countries. 
In China’s process of transiting toward 
market economy, the boundaries between 
government and market are blurred, and 
thus the corporate finance behaviors are 
irrational and distorted. In the context 
of contemporary situation in China, it is 
really worthy to study the impact of the 
changes in corporate income taxes and the 
degree of marketization on firms’ leverage 
decisions.
Literature Review
Modigliani & Miller [1] put forward 
the corporate tax MM Theorem, namely 
the debt tax shield: as debt interests are 
tax deductible expenses and, thus, reduce 
the income tax expense, the optimal 
leverage should be 100 %. Therefore, when 
the corporate income tax rate changes 
exogenously, firms are motivated to adjust 
their capital structure to maximize the 
value of the tax shield. The Miller model of 
the corporate income tax [2] also indicates 
that the higher the corporate income tax 
rate is or the larger the debt size is, the 
greater the value of the debt tax shield 
is, and the more likely firms are prone to 
debt financing. Apparently, these theories 
cannot explain firms’ financing behavior 
perfectly, because the assumptions 
underlying the theories are very strict. 
Thereafter, in terms of the capital structure 
researchers try to release the assumptions. 
Two schools came into existence: the tax 
differential school (Farrar, 1967; Brennan, 
1978) and the financial distress school 
(Altman, 1968; Betker, 1978). These two 
schools were later combined into the 
trade-off theory with the representative of 
Robichek (1967), Myers (1984), Scott (1976), 
and so on. According to the trade-off 
theory, the optimal capital structure is the 
balance point between the tax benefit of 
debt financing and the cost of bankruptcy. 
Since the 1970s, with the development 
of information asymmetry theories, new 
capital structure theories appear, such as 
the financial pecking order theory Myers 
[3], the agency cost theory (Jensen & 
Mecking, 1976; Stulz, 1990; Dewatripont & 
Tirole, 1994) and the signal theory (Ross, 
Leland & Pyle, 1977). The new theories 
laid more focus on subjective factors like 
corporate governance and information 
conduction. While the traditional MM 
theorem constructs the foundation for 
studies on tax shield effects, the trade-off 
theory and the financing pecking order 
theory are important references when we 
are constructing the regression analysis 
model. Previous research studies on the 
relationship between debt tax shields 
and capital structure usually control the 
size of the company, profitability, growth 
opportunities, asset structure, governance 
structure, etc. However, the results are 
contradictory. Davis (1987), Fischer, 
Heinkel & Zechner (1989) and Xia Li (2008), 
etc. conclude that the debt tax shield effect 
is not significant or weakly significant. On 
the contrary, Mackie-Mason [4], Givoly, 
Hayn, Ofer, Sarig [5], Genfu Feng (2000) and 
Zhiqiang Wang (2003) find that the debt tax 
shield and debt ratio are significantly and 
positively correlated. Some researchers 
believe that the external environment 
may be an important reason for the 
contradictory conclusions in the study on 
capital structure (Rajan & Zingales [6]; 
Booth, et al, 2001; Fan et al, 2010). In China, 
the degree of marketization is a non-
ignorable institutional factor in the study 
of firm’s leverage decisions. Jie Zhang 
(2000), Junxiong Fang [7], and Wei Jiang & 
Bin Li [8], in terms of the nature of property 
rights, find that state-owned enterprises 
get more loans with longer terms than 
non-state-owned enterprises. From the 
perspective of political connections, Justin 
Lin and Li Zhi Chan (2004), Jianhua Guo 
and Xingqiang Du (2011) find that, while 
political connections bring more debt 
financing to the enterprises, they also bring 
heavier policy burden to the enterprises. 
From the perspective of law and finance, 
Minggui Yu and Hongbo Pan [9] conclude 
that the more effective the regional legal 
system and finance system, the less loans 
enterprises are granted and the shorter 
the loans’ terms are. They attribute this 
fact to the local government’s intervention 
on banks’ loan policies. These research 
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studies select a particular aspect of the 
marketization process (such as the nature 
of property rights) and study its effect on 
capital structure, in the context of «soft 
budget constraint»2. So far, there are only 
two research works that study the impacts 
of marketization, as a whole, on capital 
structure. Zheng Sun, Fengwei Liu and 
Zengquan Li [12] use panel data and find 
that the higher the degree of marketization 
in the region where the company is located 
is, the lower the proportion of long-term 
debt is. Fuxiu Jiang and Jicheng Huang 
[13] find that the faster the degree of 
marketization increases, the faster the 
capital structure adjustment is, and the 
lower the degree of deviation from the 
target capital structure is. However, both 
studies have neglected the impact of debt 
tax shield on capital structure. As Miller 
said, the tax is always a unique factor in 
finance. Missing them will result in biased 
estimates. 
We find that most of above research 
works do not take into account the 2008 
corporate income tax reform, which is an 
important policy change (for example, 
Xiaoyue Chen & ChenLi, 1995; Zhengfei 
Lu & Yu Xin, 1998; Xixi Hong & Yifeng 
Shen, 2000; Changjiang Lv & Kemin Wang, 
2002). Yuetang Wang, Liang liang Wang 
and Yang Peng [14] is the single research 
that relates the 2008 reform with the 
capital structure. They study the relations 
among the nature of property rights, debt 
tax shield and capital structure. They find 
that state-owned property rights and non-
state-owned property rights exert different 
effects on the debt tax shield. Unfortunately, 
Yuetang Wang et al only select data in 2006 
and 2008 to conduct multiple regression 
analysis. They ignore the heterogeneous 
factors caused by the time variation and the 
lag effect of corporate financing decisions on 
the exogenous tax rate change. According 
to Fang Wang (1999) and Yanming Wang 
[15], changes in capital structure are mainly 
influenced by the actual effective tax rate 
(ETR). Even so, Yuetang Wang et al still 
use the change of statutory tax rate (MTR) 
as the dummy variable of tax rate change. 
Moreover, like the other researchers, they 
control the industry effect, but fail to reveal 
the industry effect caused by the impact of 
debt tax shield on asset structure. 
Yuhan Chen (2005) uses 680 A-share 
listed company’s financial data as a 
sample and find apparent potential 
tax shield effect in most companies, 
showing that further debt financing is 
feasible. Dengta Chen et al (2011) use a 
yield curve model for marginal debt tax 
shield, and conclude that Chinese listed 
companies are conservative in leverage 
decisions. As a result, the value of debt 
tax shield they can acquire is low, and 
the space for further debt financing is 
big. In regard of the background that 
Chinese listed companies use financial 
leverage insufficiently and thus gain less 
benefits from tax shield effect than the 
listed companies in developed countries, 
will the corporate capital structure be 
influenced by the 2008 corporate income 
tax reform and the different degree of 
marketization among different regions 
across the country? And will the influence 
be the same in different industries? Taking 
the opportunity of the 2008 corporate 
income tax reform, we use the financial 
data of Chinese listed companies from 
2002 to 2012 and apply the effective tax 
rate (ETR) theory and panel data mixed 
effects model to reveal the impact of the 
marketization and corporate income tax 
on the capital structure. In addition, we 
classify industries according to the Global 
Industry Classification Standard (GICS) 
and test the sensitivity of the capital 
structure to exogenous corporate tax rate 
change in different industries. We hope 
our research will provide a reference 
The «soft budget constraint» is put forward by 
Kornai [10]. It refers to the fact that, under political 
intervention, creditors are unable to enforce firms 
to do bankruptcy liquidation when they fail to pay 
principals and interests on time. In that case, firms’ 
budget constraints are soft. Yifu Lin et al [11] and Tao 
Li (2004) demonstrate the existence of «soft budget 
constraint». The «hard budget constraint» refers to the 
fact that when the enterprise fails to pay principals and 
interests on time, creditors can exert control rights on 
managers, which constrains the operation of the firms 
to some extent (Grossman & Hart, 1982). In their 
empirical research, Lang, Ofek&Stulz (1996) found 
that debt financing can reduce improper investment and 
improve the efficiency of operation.
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for future marketization reform and tax 
policies in different industries
Research Design
1. Theoretical Assumptions.
1.1. Debt Tax Shield. As a result of the 
2008 corporate income tax reform, nearly 
all Chinese enterprises experienced one of 
the two types of tax rate change:
• enterprises whose original tax rate 
was 33 % now enjoy a reduced tax rate of 
25 %; 
• enterprises whose original tax rate 
was 15 % now suffer an increased tax rate 
of 25 %. 
The later group are mainly foreign-
invested enterprises, as well as those who 
enjoyed industrial or regional beneficial 
tax rate. Changes in statutory tax rate 
would certainly affect the effective tax 
rate. According to MM theorem and the 
«Differential Taxation Hypothesis», since 
debt interests are tax deductible expenses, 
decrease (increase) in the effective tax rate 
will result in the fall (rise) of the value of 
the debt tax shield. This will accordingly 
reduce firms’ enthusiasm to borrow capital 
and make financial leverage lower (higher) 
than it was before the reform. In addition, 
taking into account the fact that the asset-
liability ratio of Chinese enterprises has 
long been lower than that of enterprises 
in developed countries, if the efficiency of 
operation is improved, firms’ ability to use 
financial leverage will be further enhanced. 
Hypothesis 1. After the 2008 corporate 
income tax reform, companies whose 
effective income tax rates (ETR) are 
increased will enhance their financial 
leverage, while companies whose effective 
income tax rates are decreased will reduce 
their financial leverage. 
Hypothesis 2. With the increase in 
firms’ ability to use leverage, their asset-
liability ratios are rising gradually. 
2. Marketization. Current research 
studies show that, in the context of im-
perfect market system, banks’ lending be-
havior becomes irrational and distorted 
(Demirgu-Kunt & Maksimovic, 1999; Gi-
annetti, 2003). Chinese banks are always 
willing to provide more debt financing to 
the state-owned listed companies. As a 
result, state-owned companies keep exces-
sive debt while non-state-owned compa-
nies suffer difficulties in debt financing. 
This fact makes the capital allocation in 
the market deviated from the optimal re-
sult. Therefore, in the regions where the 
government and enterprises are closely 
related, and the degree of marketization is 
relatively low, the «soft budget constraint» 
exists and companies do not have strong 
incentive to adjust their capital structure 
to respond to exogenous tax rate changes. 
On the contrary, in the regions where there 
is less governmental intervention and the 
development of the market is sound, com-
panies’ competition is intensive. Leverage 
governance is widespread. Thus, listed 
companies in these regions are more sensi-
tive to exogenous tax rate changes. 
 Hypothesis 3. The higher the degree of 
regional marketization, the more sensitive 
the listed companies in that jurisdiction 
are to exogenous tax rate changes and the 
more radical and the greater their capital 
structure adjustments are. 
1.3. Industry Effect. Ferri & Jones 
(1979) believe that, since firms in the 
same industry rely on similar technology 
and face similar costs in raw materials 
and labor their business risks and asset-
liability ratios are similar. Many other 
research works also find a significant 
difference in the capital structure of firms 
in different industries (Belkakoui, 1975; 
Errunza, 1979; Aggarwal, 1990; Juan, Yang 
Fenglin, 2002; Guo Pengfei SUN Pei-yuan, 
2003). In China, due to the prevalence of 
tax incentives concerning tax rates, tax 
base, etc., many firms’ effective tax rates 
are lower than their statutory tax rates. 
Therefore, the debt tax shield effect is 
limited. 
Hypothesis 4. In industries (such as 
industries concerning public well-being 
and high-tech industry) where there are 
many tax incentive policies, the debt tax 
shield effect is negligible.
2. Sample and data source.
2.1. Sample Period. The new tax law was 
passed in 2007. Since it was not effective this 
year, the new tax rate and other provisions 
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should not have a material influence 
on the related firms. However, research 
works show that the listed companies with 
tax reduction expectations had already 
conducted earnings management to avoid 
tax in that year. Therefore, we exclude the 
2007 data   because they blend the effects 
before and after the reform. To compare the 
impact of the debt tax shield on the capital 
structure before and after the tax reform, 
we divide the sample into two observation 
periods: period before the reform and period 
after the reform. Period before the reform is 
identified as the control period. We select 
the period of 2003–2006 as the control period 
for two reasons. First, according to the 
Document No. 99 (2000) issued by Chinese 
Ministry of Finance, A Notice on Seriously 
Implementing the State Department’s 
Document «A Notice on Correcting Local 
Governments’ Collect-and-Return Tax 
Policy», all «collect-and-return» preferential 
taxation policies to listed companies should 
be ended by January 1, 2002. Second, some 
variable index needs to use first-order lag 
data. We select the period of 2008–2011 as 
the sample period after the reform.
2.2. Sample Screening. By the end 
of 2010, were 2114 listed companies in 
Chinese A-share market. On this base, we 
conduct the following screening process: 
• eliminate 36 financial insurance 
companies; 
• eliminate 886 companies who did 
their IPOs after 2002; 
• eliminate 416 companies whose 
shares were trade-abnormal during 2002–
2011, including ST companies, companies 
whose shares were suspended for listing 
and companies delisted; 
•eliminate 404 companies which 
reported negative pretax income or 
income tax expense3 in 2002 to 2011; 
• eliminate 84 companies who 
changed either their GICS industry 
classifications or registered address; 
• eliminate 82 companies where the 
required financial data is not complete or 
is abnormal.  
The final sample consists of 206 listed 
companies (Table 1). Among them, 75 
sample companies experienced an increase 
in their effective tax rate in 2002–2006 and 
2008–2011, while 131 companies enjoyed a 
reduction in the same periods. The financial 
data of listed companies were mainly taken 
from Xenophon database and GuoTaian 
database. The marketization index data 
were obtained from The Marketization 
Index in China: 2011 Report for the Relative 
Marketization Process in Various Regions.
Table 1
Sample Screening Process and Number 
of Samples
A-share listed companies (by the 
end of 2010)
2014
Finance and insurance firms 36
IPO after 2002 886
ST, Suspended for listing and 
delisted
416
 Negative pretax income or income 
tax expense 
404
GICS industry classification changes 84
Registered address changes 2
Financial data not complete or 
abnormal
82
Final Samples 206
3. Model & Variables.
The panel data estimation model has 
three types of effects: a mixed effect, a 
random effect and a fixed effect. Based on 
the nature of our samples, we choose the 
mixed effect model for regression analysis:
0 1 2
3 4 5
6 ;i i
DAR ETR SIZE
ROA Z CASH
UNIQ IND
= β +β +β +
+β +β +β +
+β + β + ε∑ （A)
（B)
3  Cordes & Sheffrin (1981) and Mackie-Mason (1980) 
thought if a company’s taxable income is non-positive, 
its marginal tax rate for debt interest deduction is zero, 
so the company is in a situation of Tax Exhausted, which 
means additional debt can’t be tax deductible and the 
company lacks the tax incentives to increase debt.
0 1 2
3 4
5 6 7 8
.i i
DAR ETR DOM
ETR DOM SIZE
ROA Z CASH UNIQ
IND
= β +β +β +
+β ⋅ +β +
+β +β +β β +
+ β + ε∑
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DAR is the variable to be explained. 
It is the asset liability ratio, a measure of 
firm’s leverage (i. e., capital structure). 
DAR = total liabilities/total assets. There 
is no consensus on the measurement of 
firm’s leverage. Early empirical researchers 
usually used total liabilities to compute 
the leverage, such as Fisher, Heinkel & 
Zechner (1989). However, Taub (1975) and 
Kane, Marcus & McDonald (1984) used 
the ratio of total liabilities to shareholders’ 
equity. The former believed that both 
computations were similar in their 
rationality and could be converted to each 
other. But EINaggar (1996) pointed out that 
total liabilities contained non-interest debts 
which couldn’t provide tax shields to the 
firms. Therefore, the use of interest-bearing 
liabilities would be more accurate. We use 
the asset-liability ratio because of the non-
availability and incompleteness of data.
ETR is a dummy variable for the effective 
tax rate. In 2008, the enterprise income tax 
reform caused the change in statutory rates. 
However, firm’s capital structure is mainly 
influenced by the effective tax rate. Besides, 
many listed companies use different statutory 
rates in parent and subsidiary companies. 
So, we refer to Porcano (1986), and calculate 
ETR in the form: ETR = income tax expense/
EBIT. After eliminating the mixed effect of 
the data in 2007 and annual anomaly values 
(ETR > 1), we calculated respectively the 
average effective tax rate in 2002–2006 and 
2008–2011. ETR is 1 if ETR2008–2011 < ETR2002–2006, 
meaning the effective tax rate is reduced. ETR 
is 0 otherwise. According to Hypothesis 1, 
compared to the companies whose effective 
tax rates have increased, companies whose 
effective tax rates have decreased will obvious 
compress their debt size. So, we expected 
ETR4 coefficient to be negative. As we can see 
(Table 2), from period 2002–2006 to period 
2008–2011, the number of companies whose 
original tax rate fell in 0–10 %, 10–20 % and 
20–30 % intervals increased, but the number 
of companies with more than 30 % original 
tax rates declined obviously. This fact shows 
that the reform did reduce firms’ taxes. 
Based on Model (A), Model (B) joins a 
dummy variable (DOM) for the degree of 
marketization. Marketization index refers 
to a comprehensive index which reflects 
the following situations in a specific 
region: relationship of local government 
and market, development of non-state-
owned economy, product market, 
element market and market intermediary 
organizations, and the legal environment. 
If the sample company is registered 
in the province with higher degree of 
marketization, DOM is Otherwise, DOM 
is 0. Similar to the dummy variable 
ETR * YEAR for the effect of the reform, 
ETR * DOM is the product of the tax rate 
change and marketization degree. If a 
company’s effective tax rate decreases and 
the company is registered in a province 
with high degree of marketization, the 
cross-term is 1. Otherwise, it is 0. We rank 
the provinces according to their average 
degree of marketization in 1997–2009.
The top ten are specified as the region 
with higher degree of marketization. 
All the other provinces are specified 
as the regions with lower degree of 
marketization. Zhejiang province ranked 
the first. The top ten just included the 
four municipalities directly administered 
by the central government and all coastal 
provinces except Guangxi and Hainan 
provinces. Table 3 presents the degree of 
marketization for all provinces.
The other variables in the models are 
control variables. They are explained in 
the following paragraphs.
SIZE is the scale of a company. It 
is defined as the natural logarithm of 
total assets’ carrying value at the end of 
each year. Many works (Taggart, 1977; 
Titman, Sheridan & Wessels [16]; Wald, 
1999; Rajan & Zingales, [6] argue that 
the scale is a reverse proxy variable of 
bankruptcy probability. Large companies 
have more debts than small companies. 
4 There are four popular methods to compute ETR: ETR 
= ITE (Income Tax Expense) / EBIT, (Porcano, 1986); 
ETR = ITE / (Pretax Profit – ITE / STR); (Procano, 1986); 
ETR = (ITE — Deferred Income Tax Liabilities) / EBIT, 
(Stickney & McGee, 1982); ETR = (ITE — Deferred 
Income Tax Liabilities) / (Pretax Profit — ITE / STR), 
(Shevlin, 1987). Chinese listed companies used either 
Tax Payable Method or Tax Effect Method to account for 
income tax. Most companies used the Tax Effect Method, 
which led to very low deferred tax balance. In this case, we 
use the first ETR calculation method and do not consider 
the adjustment of deferred income tax liability.
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Table 2
ETR Distribution  
ETR 
Distribution
2002–2006 2008–2011 Percentage 
Change, %
Number of 
Сompanies 
Percent of 
Sample,%
Company 
No
Percent of 
Sample,%
0 < ETR ≤ 10 11 5,34 14 6,79 1,46
10 < ETR ≤ 20 73 35,43 89 43,20 7,77
20 < ETR ≤ 30 60 29,13 82 39,81 10,68
30 < ETR ≤ 40 53 25,73 16 7,77 –17,96
ETR > 40 9 4,37 5 2,43 –1,94
Total 206 100, 00 206 100,00 –
Table 3
The Degree of Marketization (DOM) of the Provinces 
Degree of 
Marketization Province (Arrange from high to low)
Higher 
(DOM = 1)
Zhejiang, Guangdong, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Fujian, Beijing, 
Tianjin, Shandong, Liaoning, Chongqing
Lower 
(DOM = 0)
Anhui, Hebei, Sichuan, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Hainan, 
Jiangxi, Jilin, Guangxi, Heilongjiang, Shanxi, Inner 
Mongolia, Yunnan, Shensi, Guizhou, Ningxia, Gansu, 
Xinjiang, Qinghai, Tibet
Zhengfei Lu, Yu Xin (1998) proposed 
that big companies have the ability to 
diversify their operations or integrate 
their operations vertically, which makes 
their income more stable and enables 
them to keep more debts. After a study of 
230 security issuances by 129 enterprises 
in 1950–1965, Baxter & Cragg (1970) found 
that the greater the scale of an enterprise 
was, the more it was prone to raise 
capital by issuing bonds (or by issuing 
various securities including preferred 
stock, convertible securities, and bonds). 
Therefore, we expect the SIZE coefficient 
to be positive.
ROA represents profitability. It is 
computed as the ratio of the net income 
and total assets, i. e., return on assets. 
Proxy variables available for profitability 
include return on equity, operating profit 
and marginal profit, etc. We choose 
ROA to ensure that the index calculation 
does not involve liabilities. According to 
the financing optimal sequence theory 
proposed by Myers [3], the stronger a 
firm’s profitability is, the more it is prone 
to conduct the lower cost internal financing 
instead of external financing. So, firms 
with high profitability will significantly 
reduce the level of debts. Timan & Wessels 
[16], Friend and Lang (1988) and Rajan & 
Zingales [6] also founded that profitability 
and financial leverage have negative 
correlation. We expect the sign of ROA to 
be negative. 
Bankruptcy risk Z, computed as an 
amendment of Z value which measures a 
firm’s possibility of bankruptcy each year. 
Z value (1968) was proposed by Altman. 
Graham [17] and Cbryanetal (2003) revised 
Altman’s Z value. The revised Z value is 
computed as: Z = total assets / (3,3 * profit 
before interest and tax + sales revenue + 
1,4 * retained earnings + 1,2 * net working 
capital). Liability results in a financial 
cost of paying the interest regularly and 
repaying principal when due. The revised 
Z value can be used to measure this cost. 
The smaller the value is, the better the 
firm’s overall financial condition is, and 
the smaller the possibility of bankruptcy 
is. Thus, the firm is able to obtain more 
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debts. We expect the coefficient of Z to be 
negative.
CASH is cash flow, defined as the ratio 
of net cash flow from operating activities 
and total assets. On the one hand, Jensen 
[18], a representative of the trade-off 
theory, thought that if management has a 
lot of free cash flow, it is equivalent to the 
presence of a big «buffer» which can deal 
with the future possible loss. Therefore, 
the larger the company’s free cash flow 
was, the higher a financial leverage should 
have to limit management discretion; 
On the other hand, Myers [3] proposed 
peck order theory to argue that, because 
of information asymmetry, companies 
with better profitability are prone to low 
cost internal financing instead of external 
financing. Accordingly, we expect the sign 
of CASH to be uncertain.
UNIQ represents uniqueness. It 
is computed as the ratio of the sum of 
selling expenses and R&D expenses and 
sales revenue. Timan & Wessels [16] 
thought that companies who produce 
unique products will have lower leverage 
because it is more difficult for their 
customers to find substitutes of their 
service or products.  Balakrishman & Fox 
(1993) argue that brands, R&D expenses 
and other investments in reputation will 
influence firms’ ability. The higher the 
proportion of intangible assets is, the 
better the firm’s credit level is, and the 
easier it is for the firm to get loans. We 
expect the sign of UNIQ to be positive.
IND is a dummy variable for industry. 
In order to strengthen the international 
comparability of this paper, unlike the 
previous researches that followed CSRC’s 
industry classification, we choose the 
global industry classification system 
(GICS) launched by standard & poor’s 
(S&P) and Morgan Stanley (MSCI) in 
August 1999. Specifically, we classify 
the sample companies into 10 industries: 
energy, raw materials, industrial, 
consumer discretionary, consumer goods, 
health care, real estate, information 
technology, telecommunication services, 
and utilities. We set up as many as nine 
dummy variables, so as to observe the 
industry effect of the debt tax shield.
4. Empirical results.
4.1. Descriptive Statistics. Table 4 
presents the descriptive statistics and 
the Pearson correlation matrix for all 
the variables, from which we can see the 
statistical characteristics of all the variables 
and their correlations. The absolute value 
of the correlation coefficient between any 
two variables are less than 0,35, indicating 
that there is no serious multicollinearity.
The mean (mean, median) of DAR 
of the sample companies in 2003–2011 
is about 50 %. For developed countries, 
due to the limited availability of foreign 
listed company data, we refer to the 
approach of Yuancheng Hu (2008), and 
only compare with the listed companies 
that are included in some countries’ stock 
indices in the same period; for developing 
countries, we use for comparison the DAR 
data of some developing countries offered 
in the study of Rajan & Zingales (2000). 
The result shows that, for a rather long 
time, the DAR of Chinese listed companies 
is low compared to the companies in 
developed countries, and at the medium 
level compared to the companies in 
developing countries. This means that 
Chinese companies did not make a good 
use of financial leverage (Table 5).
4.2. The applicability of MM theorem. 
Model (A) in Table 6 partially demonstrates 
applicability of the MM theorem. Adjusted 
R2 is 0,3060，which is significant at the 1 % 
level and indicates that the overall model fits 
well. The signs of ETR and the cross term 
is negative, indicating that, in the period of 
2008 –2011, compared to companies with 
increased effective tax rates, companies with 
decreased effective tax rates reduced the 
proportion of debt financing significantly. This 
result is in line with the «differential taxation 
hypothesis». The sign of Year is positive. Due 
to the increasing emphasis on the leverage 
governance theory, the overall debt ratios 
increased in 2008. 
As to the control variables, the signs of 
firm size, bankruptcy risk and uniqueness 
are in line with expectations. This indicates 
that a bigger size, a lower bankruptcy risk 
and more prominent uniqueness will 
make it easier for companies to obtain 
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Table 4
Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlation Matrix
Panel A: The descriptive statistics
Variable N Minimum Maximum Median Mean
Std
DAR 1 648 0,0826 0,9027 0,5122 0,5073 0,1544
SIZE 1 648 8,6787 11,6614 9,5357 9,6093 0,4837
ROA 1 648 –0,0051 1,4413 0,0350 0,0451 0,0483
Z 1 648 0,0454 27,7986 0,8344 1,0024 1,0433
CASH 1 648 –0,3350 0,5526 0,0618 0,0604 0,0850
UNIQ 1 648 0,0000 0,5158 0,0392 0,0611 0,0722
Panel B: Correlations
DAR SIZE ROA Z CASH UNIQ
DAR 1 – – – – –
SIZE 0,296** 1 – – – –
ROA –0,341** 0,044 1 – – –
Z –0,128** 0,105** –0,176** 1 – –
CASH –0,194** 0,006 0,278** –0,019 1 –
UNIQ 0,244** –0,140** 0,081** –0,001 0,055* 1
Note. *, ** and *** denote significant level of 1 %, 5 % and 10 % (hereinafter the same).
Table 5
Asset-liability Ratio of Companies in Various Countries
Index Stock type DAR, % sample Sample period
DAX30 (Germany) 67 24 2004.12.31
CAC40 (France) 67 29 2003.12.31–2004.12.31
MIB30 (Italy) 64 14 2003.12.31–2004.12.31
AEX25 (Netherland) 62 19 2003.12.31–2004.12.31
FTSE100 (UK) 62 51 2004.12.31–2005.12.31
Dow Jones Global 57 21 2003.12.31–2004.12.31
DJIA (US) 56 24 2004.12.31
KFX20 (Denmark) 55 14 2003.12.31–2004.12.31
China 48 1 222 2003.12.31–2004.12.31
Developing Countries DAR, % sample  Sample period 
Korea 73 93 1980–1990
India 67 93 1980–1990
Pakistan 66 96 1980–1987
Turkey 59 45 1983–1990
China 50 206 2003–2011
Thailand 49 91 1983–1990
Jordan 47 38 1983–1990
Malaysia 42 96 1983–1990
Zimbabwe 42 48 1980–1988
Mexico 35 99 1984–1990
Brazil 30 49 1985–1991
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loans, and result in higher asset-liability 
ratio. The sign of return on assets and 
cash flow are negative, which means that 
companies with better profitability and 
more free cash flow are more prone to 
choose lower cost internal financing. This 
indicates that the relatively conservative 
«financing Pecking Order Theory» fits 
better to the actual situation of Chinese 
listed companies than the trade-off theory. 
Five controlled variables in Model (A) are 
significant at the 1 % level, and their signs 
are in line with expectations.
4.3. Further expansion based on 
marketization. Considering actual 
situations in China, we expand our research 
study of how the degree of marketization 
influences the debt tax shield effect. Figure 
Table 6 
Empirical Results of Theoretical Assumptions (Mixed Effects Model)
Variable
Expected 
Sign
Model (A) Model (B)
C ?
–0,3090*** –0,5313***
(–4,6066) (–7,1346)
DUMMY ETR
–
–0,0146**
(–2,1286)
–0,0434***
(–3,8813)
DOM
? –
0,0212*
(1,8639)
ETR*DOM
– –
–0,0454***
(–3,2512)
CONTROL SIZE
+
0,0912***
(13,2073)
0,0443***
(13,9779)
ROA
?
–0,9620***
(–13,3114)
–0,9465***
(–13,4418)
Z
–
-0.0084***
(–2,6185)
–0,0150***
(–4,4638)
CASH
?
–0,1818***
(–4,5144)
–0,1137***
(–2,6983)
UNIQ
+
0,3774***
(8,1667)
0,2602***
(4,8398)
Sample Number 206 206
Adjusted-R2 0,2551 0,3099
F-statistic 95,0279*** 44,5166***
1 shows the number of sample companies 
in each province in terms of their registered 
addresses. The numbers of samples in 
Shanghai and Guangdong are the greatest 
and account for 14,08 % and 8,74 % of the 
total sample, respectively. There are more 
than 10 sample companies in Jiangsu, 
Beijing, Zhejiang, Shandong and Fujian. 
These provinces are considered as regions 
with higher degree of marketization (see 
Table 2). Tianjin, Chongqing and Liaoning 
province are also included into this group. 
So, the number of listed companies in 
the ten regions with a higher degree of 
marketization makes up 62,69 % of the total 
sample. If the corporate income tax reform 
exerted a good effect on companies in these 
regions, it is proper to say that the reform 
affects most of the companies.
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Model B in Table 6 presents the 
empirical results of the debt tax shield 
based on the variance in marketization. 
The sign of ETR is still negative, indicating 
that, for companies with decreased ETR, 
their DARs also decline. The sign of DOM 
is positive. This shows that, in regions 
with a higher degree of marketization, 
the asset-liability ratios are higher and 
the companies are more willing to 
use fi nancial leverage. But in regions 
with a lower degree of marketization, 
the companies are relatively more 
conservative and, thus, keep relatively 
a lower asset-liability ratio. The sign 
of ETR * DOM is negative, indicating 
that in regions with a higher degree of 
marketization, when ETR declines, DAR 
will decline in sync, and the absolute value 
of the coeffi cient (–0,0454) is greater than 
the absolute value of the ETR coeffi cient 
(–0,434). This demonstrates Hypothesis 
3: when the degree of marketization is 
higher, the adjustment of the capital 
structure is more sensitive to the change 
of debt tax shield and the tax planning is 
more radical. Since the number of listed 
companies in regions with a high degree 
of marketization makes up a majority of 
the total sample, we can conclude that 
this reform is effective. What’s more, the 
sign of control variables are consistent 
with expectations and are signifi cant at 
the level of 1 %
Figure 1. Number of Sample Companies Based on Registered Address
    Figure 2 presents the relationship 
of degree of marketization, effective 
tax rate and asset-liability ratio. In the 
two lines where ETR = 1 (falling), the 
companies whose DOM = 1 (with a higher 
degree of market) has a more signifi cant 
decline in 2006 –2008 than companies 
whose DOM = 0. This is also true when 
ETR rises. This further demonstrates the 
conclusion that the higher the degree of 
marketization is, the more obvious the 
debt tax shield effect is. Besides, we also 
fi nd that the asset-liability ratios of all 
the companies increased, showing that 
Chinese companies are narrowing the gap 
against companies in developed countries 
in the usage of fi nancial leverage.
Since both the corporate income tax 
and the degree of marketization affect the 
capital structure, we would like to know 
whose effect is more signifi cant. Using 
ETR and DOM as dummy variables, 
we conduct univariate regression to see 
whether the explanation of ETR and 
DOM is signifi cant. The result is shown 
in Table 7. The corporate income tax 
(ETR) is signifi cant at the level of 10 % 
and the degree of marketization (DOM) 
is signifi cant at the level of 1 %. The 
explanation proportion of ETR’s and 
DOM to asset-liability ratio is 0,0011 
and 0,0058, respectively. The analysis 
shows that, compared with the effective 
tax rate, the degree of marketization is 
Journal of Tax Reform, 2016, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 43–58
55
ISSN 2412-8872
Figure 2. Marketization, ETR and Asset-liability Ratio
more signifi cant in infl uencing the capital 
structure.
4.4. Debt tax shield effect on 
capital structure at industrial level. 
Referring to GICS ( Global Industry 
Classifi cation Standard)5, we divide the 
sample companies into several sectors, 
as is shown in Table 8. Table 8 presents 
the ranking of ETR and DAR and their 
changes before and after the reform. 
Table 7
ETR&DOM Univariate Regression
Variables C t Adjusted R2
ETR –0,0192* –1,7018 0,0011
DOM 0,0364*** 3,2696 0,0058
From the perspective of ETR, we fi nd that 
industries related to public well-fare such 
as utilities and consumer goods assume 
lower tax burden, while manufacturing 
industries such as consumer discretionary 
and materials take heavier tax burden. 
From the perspective of DAR, we fi nd that 
real estate industry shows an apparent 
reliance on leverage and has the highest 
asset-liability ratio and the highest risk, 
while public well-fare industries such as 
utilities and consumer goods and high-
tech industries such as health care and 
information technology have relatively 
low debt ratios. From the perspective of 
the changes in ETR and DAR, ETR of most 
of industries declined, although ETR of 
telecom services, energy and utilities rose 
due to the cancellation of tax incentive 
policies to them. In addition, health 
care and information technology show 
adverse movements compared to other 
industries in DAR because the «Three 
New» incentive policy was still in effect. 
The debt tax shield effect is relatively not 
signifi cant.
According to GICS, the composition of each 
section is as follows: industrial includes 
capital goods, commercial & professional 
service,  and transportation; consumer 
discretionary includes automobiles and 
components, consumer durables and 
apparel, consumer service, media and 
retailing; consumer goods include food 
and staples retailing, food, beverages & 
tobacco, household and personal products; 
health care includes health care  equipment 
& services, pharmaceuticals, biotechnology 
& life sciences; information technology 
includes software & services, technology 
hardware & equipment and semiconductor 
sand semiconductor equipment. The other 
sectors only include one industry in them.
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Finally, we analyze the industry’s effect 
in terms of the debt tax shield on the capital 
structure. Table 9 presents the results. 
Most of the sectors have an significant 
effect on DAR, except for consumer goods 
whose P value is relatively higher. Health 
care and information technology industry 
are significant at the level of 10 %, the 
rest of the industries are significant at the 
level of 1 %. The reason that consumer 
goods industry is less significant may 
be that there are rigid market demands 
on industries related to public well-fare, 
which attract governmental care in regard 
of on these industries. Healthcare and 
Table 8 
Ranking of Sample companies’ ETR and DAR Before and After the Reform
Industry
Number of 
company
Percent, 
%
Ranking 
before Reform
Ranking after 
Reform
Ranking of 
Change from 
Reform
ETR DAR ETR DAR ΔETR ΔDAR
Energy 9 4,37 2 3 8 5 9 9
Materials 37 17,96 8 9 5 8 4 5
Industrial 44 21,36 4 8 4 7 6 6
Consumer 
discretionary
47 22,82 10 7 9 9 5 8
Consumer 
goods
12 5,83 3 2 1 2 1 7
Health care 17 8,25 9 1 6 1 2 1
Real estate 22 10,68 6 10 3 10 3 4
Information 
technology
10 4,85 5 5 7 3 7 2
Telecom 1 0,49 7 6 10 4 10 3
Utilities 7 3,40 1 4 2 6 8 10
information technology industries are 
relatively not significant because their 
high technology arouses preferential tax 
policies. In terms of signs, the negative 
sign of the telecommunications industry 
may be of interest because there is only 
one company in the sample (600050: China 
Unicom). The sign of the other industries 
are positive showing that Chinese 
companies’ debt ratio has increased 
overall. This, on the one hand reflects the 
improved ability of Chinese companies to 
use financial leverage, and, on the other 
hand, indicates that Chinese companies’ 
face increasing operating risks.
Table 9 
Industry Effect according to MM Theorem
Industry Model (A) Model (B)
Energy 0,0556*** (2,3648) 0,0487** (2,0641)
Materials 0,0790*** (4,1846) 0,0810*** (4,2714)
Industrial 0,0872*** (4,5952) 0,0904*** (4,7715)
Consumer discretionary 0,1218*** (6,3976) 0,1245*** (6,5594)
Consumer goods
0,0353 (1,5592) 0,0378* (1,6735)
Health care 0,0447** (1,9769) 0,0425* (1,8824)
Real Estate 0,1273*** (6,2435) 0,1308*** (6,4189)
Information Technology
0,0403* (1,7476) 0,0441* (1,9175)
Telecom –0,1796*** (–3,3514) –0,1631*** (–3,0496)
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4.5. Robustness tests. In order to test 
the stability of the above conclusions, 
we make the following robustness tests: 
in Model (A) and Model (B) we use the 
liability growth rate, the interest-bearing 
debt ratio and the interest-bearing debt 
growth rate as the explaining variables. 
With the same two-stage least squares 
method, we get the same conclusion.
There is a big difference in the number 
of sample companies in each province. 
For example, the number of sample 
companies is the largest in the location of 
the two stock exchanges (Shanghai Stock 
Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange), 
but the number of sample companies is 
small in provinces with the least degree 
of marketization, such as Ningxia, 
Qinghai, etc. We think that some of the 
companies may operate in locations other 
than their registered address to reduce 
transaction costs and expand the sources 
of information. In that case, we exclude 
sample companies from Shanghai and 
Guangdong in robustness test to solve the 
problem. We draw the same conclusion.
The above tests show that the 
conclusions of this study are robust and 
reliable. The test results are not listed here 
to limit the length of the paper. 
Conclusions and Suggestions
Based on the 2008 Enterprise Income 
Tax Reform in China, this paper explores 
the influence of exogenous changes of 
the enterprise income tax rate on the 
capital structure. The empirical results 
demonstrate our hypotheses. First, the 
exogenous change of the enterprise 
income tax rate would affect the capital 
structure, and ETR is positively correlated 
to debt financing. Second, the higher the 
degree of regional marketization is, the 
more sensitive the listed companies in 
that jurisdiction are to the tax shield effect 
and the more radical their tax planning 
is. Third, compared to the change of the 
enterprise income tax rate, differences 
in degree of marketization exert a more 
significant effect on corporate capital 
structure. The explanation of the former 
is 0,0011 and the explanation of the latter 
is 0,0058. Fourth, because of the long-
term existence of tax incentives, the debt 
tax shield is not significant in consumer 
goods, health care and information 
technology industries. Fifth, the asset-
liability ratios of Chinese listed companies 
is in a rising trend. While this reflects the 
improving abilities of those companies to 
use financial leverage, it also shows the 
deterioration of their operating risks.
Policy suggestions are as follows:
1. Foster market reform. In eastern 
coastal provinces and municipalities 
where the degree of marketization is 
higher, the adjustment of the enterprise 
capital structure is more sensitive to the 
exogenous tax reform, and the tax planning 
is more radical. In addition, the degree of 
marketization exerts a more significant 
effect on capital structure than the change 
of the corporate income tax rate does. In 
order to guarantee the effectiveness of 
the reform, China should take an effort 
to improve the marketization level of 
the less developed provinces. In terms of 
taxes, this includes reducing companies’ 
tax burden, increasing transparency of tax 
collection and management, etc.
2. Different tax incentives in different 
industries. Regional tax incentives may 
result in company moves to avoid tax and 
inefficient operation. We have found the 
industry effect in this paper, so the debt tax 
shield effect is significant in most industries, 
especially in industrial enterprises, but 
not significant in industries such as public 
well-fare industries and high-tech industry, 
where tax incentives exist. So, preferential 
tax policies could be used to support 
development of key enterprises and growth 
of specific industries.
3. Keep reasonable level of liabilities. 
In recent years, the asset-liability ratios 
of Chinese listed companies have ben 
rising. On the one hand, this reflects 
that Chinese companies’ ability of using 
financial leverage is closer to that of the 
companies in developed countries. On the 
other hand, this also implies an increasing 
operating risk. Therefore, companies 
cannot expand debt financing blindly 
to achieve, a maximized debt tax shield. 
They should take into account the risks 
and keep a reasonable debt level. 
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